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Abstract
In many moral hazard problems, the principal evaluates the agent's performance
based on signals which the agent may suppress and replace with counterfeits. This
form of fraud may aﬀect the design of optimal contracts drastically, leading to complete
market failure in extreme cases. I show that in optimal contracts, the principal deters
all fraud, and does so by two complementary mechanisms. First, the principal punishes
signals that are suspicious, i.e. appear counterfeit. Second, the principal is lenient on
bad signals that the agent could suppress, but does not.
1 Introduction
In high proﬁle cases of corporate earnings manipulation and public medical insurance
fraud, the social cost of fraud is quite visible.1 However, fraud is possible but conspicu-
ously absent in many other markets. For example, websites may defraud advertisers by
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1 A string of accounting scandals including Adelphia, Enron, and Worldcom led to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. Several large Medicare fraud rings have been uncovered recently; see for example Justice
Department charges 91 in $295 million Medicare fraud scheme available at http://news.blogs.cnn.com/
2011/09/07/justice-department-charges-91-in-295-million-medicare-fraud-scheme/.
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inserting and billing for fake clicks on advertisements. Unemployed workers may cir-
cumvent government incentives by organizing fake job interviews.2 Security ﬁrms may
cover up break-ins that occur on their watch. These types of fraud only occur rarely.
But this does not imply that fraud is innocuous in these cases, as the mere possibility
of fraud may impose severe hidden costs. For example, consider a moral hazard prob-
lem in which the agent may either exert eﬀort, or may use a costless fraud technology
that allows him to mimic eﬀort perfectly. Regardless of the contract that the principal
oﬀers, the agent prefers to mimic exerting eﬀort. Anticipating this, the principal does
not oﬀer any contract to the agent. Therefore there is a complete market failure even
though no fraud is committed. More generally, incentives may be distorted substan-
tially by the agent being able to commit fraud. The question of the paper is, how does
the possibility of fraud aﬀect the design of incentives in moral hazard problems?
In my model, a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent face a dynamic moral
hazard problem. The agent's eﬀort choice in the ﬁrst period is unobserved, but it
determines the distribution of signals realized in the subsequent periods. However, these
signals are also not observed by the principal. Rather, the agent is able to suppress some
types of signal, and replace them with a counterfeit signal drawn from an exogenous
counterfeit signal distribution. The principal pays the agent each period, based on the
signals she has observed to date. The agent has a dynamic programming problem to
determine which signals to suppress conditional on the history of signal realizations.
The principal has an optimal contract design problem, to choose the optimal payment
policy to implement a target eﬀort and fraud policy.
In classic moral hazard models, the agent only has one choice to make, so gradual
draws of signals may be equivalently modeled as simultaneous draws. However, my
model is necessarily dynamic as the agent must decide whether to suppress a signal
before observing the next one.
The ﬁrst result characterizes the fraud policies in optimal contracts. Fraud may be
costly for the agent to commit, and may be risky for the agent if there is a chance of
getting caught. The ﬁrst result establishes that no fraud is an optimal fraud policy,
and that no optimal fraud policy involves any risky or costly fraud; in these cases,
the principal may simulate fraud more eﬃciently than the agent can commit it. To
simulate fraud, the principal draws a simulated counterfeit signal from the counterfeit
signal distribution, and pays the agent as if she had observed the simulated signal. In
other words, the principal may simulate fraud by paying the agent a lottery. If fraud
is costly, the principal deducts the costs from the payments, and hence recovers these
2 In countries with time-unlimited unemployment insurance (such as Australia and the United Kingdom),
claimants are required to document their job search activities to continue receiving payments.
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costs. If fraud is costless, the principal may improve on the lottery: she may recover the
risk premium of the lottery by paying the agent the certainty equivalent. The resulting
payment policy deters fraud if it does not improve the agent's ability to distort signals.3
The second result characterizes optimal payment policies to deter fraud. As in
standard moral hazard models, each signal contains news about the agent's eﬀort.
There are two additional attributes of signals. First, if a signal is outside the support of
the counterfeit signal distribution, then it is unsuspicious. On the other hand, a signal
assigned a higher probability under this distribution is more suspicious, ceteris paribus.
Second, a signal may be suppressible or unsuppressible. The second result answers
the question: how do these three attributes of signals aﬀect payments? Measures of
how good the news is, and how suspicious the news is, are constructed from the signal
separately. This means that better news is rewarded more, and more suspicious news
is rewarded less, ceteris paribus. However, the payment policy is lenient on bad news
that is suppressible. This dampens the incentive to suppress bad news. The lenience of
the principal after suﬃciently bad suppressible news involves disregarding the severity
of the news; therefore optimal contracts may be incomplete.
Finally, the paper explores two special cases. The counterfeit good news case cor-
responds to the click fraud and fake job interview examples. In this case, either good
news or no news arrives every period. If no news arrives, then the agent may fabricate
good news. Thus, the principal must measure how suspicious the good news appears,
and punish suspicious news adequately to deter fraud. This becomes more costly for
her as the real and counterfeit signal distributions become more alike. I argue that the
contracts employed in the internet advertising industry match the predictions of the
model.
The bad news suppression case corresponds to the example of covering up break-
ins, and also to covering up safety and environmental disasters. In this case, either bad
news or no news arrives. Bad news that is more costly to suppress is punished more
than bad news that is cheaper to suppress. I argue that ineﬃcient incentives in the
internet computer security industry led a company, DigiNotar to attempt to cover up
an intrusion, ultimately leading to its bankruptcy.
Fraud and incentives for truth-telling have long been a consideration in mechanism
design, and there are several strands of related literature. The revelation principle is
a central part in the analysis of mechanism design problems in which communication
is costless and misrepresentation is undetectable. In these problems, the revelation
principle holds very generally and plays a purely technical role to simplify mechanism
3 The condition used throughout most of the paper is that all signals in the support of the counterfeit
signal distribution are unsuppressible. More general conditions are discussed in Section 4.3.
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design problems by focusing on direct (non-fraud) mechanisms. However, when the
message the agent may send is partially constrained by the state of the world, the issue
of misrepresentation becomes more subtle, and the revelation principle only holds under
more restricted conditions. Green and Laﬀont (1986) introduced partially veriﬁable
information to mechanism design, in which the set of messages that the agent is able to
send is state-dependent and is a subset of the agent's type space. If evidence satisﬁes
the nested range condition, then a social choice function is implementable if and only
if it is truthfully implementable. Bull and Watson (2007) drop the requirement that
the message space is a subset of the type space. They show that if evidence satisﬁes a
weaker condition called normality, then a strong revelation principle holds in the sense
that every mechanism is equivalent to one with full evidence disclosure. Kartik and
Tercieux (2011) study full implementation (of Nash equilibrium) where evidence may
be fabricated by the agents at some state-dependent cost. They show that for three or
more players, a social choice function is implementable without costly fabrication if and
only if evidence is cost-monotonic and the social choice rule satisﬁes no veto power.
They do not study whether it is (second-best) optimal to deter costly fabrication and
do not accommodate the possibility of a fabrication attempt being unsuccessful.
Townsend (1979) studies a model in which agents may hide their endowments, but
the principal may audit them at some cost. In this costly state veriﬁcation model,
optimal contracts deter misrepresentation by the use of random audits. While auditing
is not explicitly present in my model, the risk of an audit is similar to the risk of a
counterfeit signal appearing suspicious. However, in contrast to costly state veriﬁcation
models, the principal never learns for sure if a counterfeit signal is indeed counterfeit.
Costly state falsiﬁcation was introduced by Lacker and Weinberg (1989). In their
model, the agent may misrepresent his endowment, but he incurs a cost that increases
in the size of the misrepresentation. Fake and real reports appear identical to the
principal. They summarize their results by saying that the optimal contract will be
a no-falsiﬁcation contract if (the agent) is not too risk averse or if the falsiﬁcation
cost function is not too convex. Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995) and Crocker and
Morgan (1998) elaborate, ﬁnding that when falsiﬁcation has an increasing marginal
cost, optimal contracts involve falsiﬁcation in almost all states. Moreover, in optimal
contracts, the agent conducts falsiﬁcation at some states by reporting impossible states
(outside the support of the distribution). This contrasts sharply with the situation in
this paper: fraud is deterred at every history, and if a signal is suspicious then the
agent is punished. Crocker and Slemrod (2007) and Crocker and Gresik (2010) adapt
the model to a moral hazard environment, with the leading application of executive
compensation with earnings manipulation. Again, they ﬁnd that optimal contracts
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involve falsiﬁcation.
Finally, Allen and Gale (1992) considers fraud as a possible answer to the puzzle,
why are contracts simpler in practice than in theory? They argue that if an agent is able
to manipulate some signals, then optimal contracts are incomplete in the sense that
payments are insensitive to those signals. A similar form of incompleteness appears in
optimal contracts in my counterfeit signals model as well: all suﬃciently bad suppress-
ible news is treated the same. On the other hand, contracts are more complicated in
the sense that payments depend on how suspicious the signals are.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an example
that illustrates the ideas of suspicious information and lenience. Section 3 describes a
dynamic moral hazard model with eﬀort and fraud. Section 4 establishes that optimal
contracts deter risky and costly fraud. Section 5 applies the ﬁrst-order approach to
characterize the optimal payment policy. Section 6 and Section 7 study special cases of
the model, and relate them to click fraud and cover-ups of security intrusions, respec-
tively. Appendix A provides omitted proofs, and Appendix B establishes the validity
of the ﬁrst-order approach for a special case of the model.
2 Example
A risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent would like to trade. The agent has a
utility function u : R→ R and an outside option w. He chooses eﬀort e ∈ {0, 1}, where
e = 1 means high eﬀort. He receives a private signal θˆ ∈ {A,B,C} that is distributed
pi(·|e) =
(1, 0, 0) if e = 0,(13 , 13 , 13) if e = 1.
The A signal is bad news that indicates low eﬀort, and the B and C signals are good
news that indicate high eﬀort. The agent has access to a costless fraud technology
that allows him to suppress A and replace it with a counterfeit B. I write f = 1
if he decides to use this technology, and f = 0 otherwise. The resulting signal θ is
public. The θ = B signal may be interpreted as suspicious, because the principal
can not distinguish between real and counterfeit B signals. The principal's problem
is to choose payments p(θ) for each state θ in order to minimize the expected cost of
implementing eﬀort e = 1 subject to a voluntary participation (VP) and an incentive
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compatibility (IC) constraint:
min
p(·),f
E[p(θ)|e = 1, f ]
s.t. (VP) E[u(p(θ))|e = 1, f ]− 1 ≥ u(w),
(IC) (1, f) ∈ argmax
(eˆ,fˆ)
E[u(p(θ))|eˆ, fˆ ]− eˆ.
This problem has a solution that involves no fraud (i.e. f = 0). To see this, suppose
that p(·) implements (e, f) = (1, 1). Then the following payment policy implements
(e, f) = (1, 0) by simulating fraud:
pˆ(θ) =
p(B) if θ = A or θ = B,p(C) if θ = C.
Under the payment policy pˆ(·), the agent is indiﬀerent between committing fraud or not,
since the principal pays him the same amount after A and B signals. The principal's
implementation cost is the same under both payment policies, so the new payment
policy is also a solution the principal's problem.
Since there is a solution that deters fraud, we may focus on contracts that deter
fraud. This simpliﬁes the principal's problem:
min
p(·)
1
3
[p(A) + p(B) + p(C)]
s.t. (VP)
1
3
[u(p(A)) + u(p(B)) + u(p(C))]− 1 ≥ u(w),
(IC-e)
1
3
[u(p(A)) + u(p(B)) + u(p(C))]− 1 ≥ u(p(A)),
(IC-f) u(p(A)) ≥ u(p(B)),
where (IC-e) requires that eﬀort e = 1 is optimal and (IC-f) requires that abstaining
from fraud is optimal.
It is straightforward to show that if p∗(·) is a solution to the principal's problem,
then all three constraints hold with equality at p∗ (·). Since all of the constraints share
four common expressions, all four of these expressions are equal, so that w = p∗(A) =
p∗(B) < p∗(C). The agent is awarded the most after a C signal, as it is good news that
is not the result of counterfeiting. Even though B is equally as good news as C, it is
rewarded less than C because it is more suspicious. Finally, A is rewarded the same as
B, even though it is worse news than B; the principal must be lenient after A to deter
fraud.
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This optimal contract is not unique; there is also an optimal contract that involves
fraud. If the principal pays the agent
p′(θ) =
p∗(A)− ε if θ = A,p∗(θ) if θ 6= A,
where ε > 0, then the agent will commit fraud and receive the same payment as under
p∗(·). Thus, p′(·) implements (e, f) = (1, 1) at the same cost to the principal.
This example illustrates several ideas that are important in the general model. The
principal may deter fraud by simulating fraud on the agent's behalf  in the example,
by replacing A with B. This means the implementation problem may be simpliﬁed by
focusing on no-fraud contracts. The optimal contract involves rewarding good news
more than bad news (p(C) > p(A)), unsuspicious news more than suspicious news
(p(C) > p(B)), and being lenient on suppressible bad news (p(A) = p(B)).
3 Model
P commits
to a
payment
policy
A chooses
eﬀort
A gets a
private
signal
A chooses
whether to
commit fraud
P pays A
repeated T times
Figure 1: The moral hazard problem with counterfeit signals.
This paper studies a dynamic moral hazard model, which is summarized in Figure 1.
There is a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent with an increasing utility
function u : R → R. They both discount at rate β over T + 1 time periods. In the
ﬁrst period, the agent exerts unobservable eﬀort e ∈ [0, 1], which the principal values
at v(e). In each subsequent time period t, the agent receives a private signal θˆt that is
distributed according to pi(·|e), which has full support over a ﬁnite set Θ. The agent has
access to a fraud technology, which consists of two parts. The agent ﬁrst suppresses the
signal θˆt, which costs c(θˆt) ∈ {0,∞}.4 Then the agent counterfeits a replacement signal
which is drawn from the counterfeit signal distribution φ(·). The principal observes the
resulting public signal θt. I assume that the support of φ(·) only includes unsuppressible
4 I also study an extension with general suppression costs c(θ) ∈ [0,∞] in Section 4.2 and Section 7.
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signals, i.e. c(θ) = ∞. This implies that the agent may not conduct fraud more than
once in each time period.5
At the start of the game, the principal commits to a payment policy {pt(·)}. This
means that the principal promises to pay the agent pt(θ
t) at the end of period t based
on the history of public signals θt = θ1, . . . , θt. At any time period t ≤ T , there are
two relevant value functions for the agent: the agent's value before the private signal
is drawn, Wt(e; θ
t−1), and after the private signal is drawn, Vt(e; θt−1, θˆt). The agent's
history of private signals θˆt−1 is not payoﬀ relevant, so it is dropped from his Bellman
equations:
Wt(e; θ
t−1) =
∑
θˆ
pi(θˆ|e)Vt(e; θt−1, θˆ) (1)
Vt(e; θ
t−1, θˆ) = max
u(pt(θt−1, θˆ)) + βWt+1(e; θt−1, θˆ),∑
θ φ(θ)
[
u(pt(θ
t−1, θ)− c(θˆ)) + βWt+1(e; θt−1, θ)
]
,
(2)
where
WT+1(e; θ
t) = 0.
A candidate solution to the agent's dynamic fraud problem in (2) is a fraud policy
ft : Θ
t → {0, 1}, where ft(θt−1, θˆt) = 1 means the agent suppresses the signal θˆt after a
history of public signals θt−1. (In the contracting problem below, it will be possible to
think of the eﬀort and fraud policy choices being made simultaneously, so e is omitted
from the agent's private history in the fraud policy.) The no-fraud policy {f∗t (·)}Tt=1
involves no fraud at every history. The agent chooses eﬀort e to maximize βW1(e)− e.
This paper studies the principal's implementation problem.
Problem 1. The principal's implementation problem is to minimize the expected cost
of implementing eﬀort e,
C(e) = min
{pt(·)},{ft(·)}
E
[
T∑
t=1
βtpt(θ
t)
∣∣∣∣∣e, {ft(·)}
]
s.t. (VP) βW1(e)− e ≥ u0
(IC-e) e ∈ argmax
eˆ∈[0,1]
βW1(eˆ)− eˆ
(IC-f) ft(·) solves the dynamic programming problem in (1) and (2),
where the eﬀort e and the fraud policy determines the distribution of θt: θˆt ∼ pi(·|e) is
5 I discuss the role of this assumption and several possible generalizations in Section 4.3.
8
drawn ﬁrst, and if ft(θ
t−1, θˆt) = 0 then θt = θˆt; otherwise θt ∼ φ(·). I say that the
payment policy {pt(·)} implements eﬀort e and fraud policy {ft(·)} if these items satisfy
the (VP), (IC-e) and (IC-f) constraints.
This model has two novel features. Firstly, the agent does not (necessarily) have
complete control over the outcome of the fraud. In both the costly state veriﬁcation
and costly state falsiﬁcation literatures, agents may counterfeit any signal they like,
and the fraud technology is entirely predictable. In contrast, this model accommodates
unpredictable fraud technologies. For example, if a publisher does a fake click, it does
not know what information the advertiser has previously stored about the fake visitor
to the website, and can not fully anticipate how suspicious the click will appear. If an
agent oﬀers to bribe a witness to suppress information, the agent does not know for
sure whether the bribe will be accepted and honored.
Secondly, the agent's fraud decision is dynamic. The agent may base his decisions
to commit fraud based on the success or failure of previous attempts at fraud; this
allows him to avoid accruing many suspicious signals. Conversely, the agent may not
defer fraud decisions; he may not retroactively suppress information that is already
public. For example, advertisers observe clicks as they happen. A website publisher
may reduce the amount of click fraud it commits based on how suspicious the previous
clicks appeared. However, the publisher may not retroactively add fake clicks.
4 Optimal Fraud Policy
Fraud is socially undesirable, as it is unproductive, and potentially includes several
social costs. Firstly, fraud may be risky: if there is a chance of being caught, perpe-
trators take on risks beyond their control. Secondly, Section 4.2 studies an extension
in which fraud involves paying a suppression cost. Finally, fraud destroys information,
and therefore hampers the provision of incentives. Given that fraud is ineﬃcient, an
important question is what level of fraud is optimal, after taking into account the dif-
ﬁculties of incentives. This section shows that under general conditions, the principal
may transform contracts with risky fraud into better contracts (with lower implemen-
tation costs) without fraud. The logic resembles the revelation principle. Suppose the
principal knows the distribution of counterfeit signals and which signals are suppress-
ible. Then the principal may simulate fraud by paying the agent a lottery based on a
random draw from the counterfeit signal distribution. Under quite general conditions,
the fraud simulation lottery deters fraud. In addition, the principal may replace the
lottery draws with their certainty equivalents without disrupting incentives. This allows
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the principal to recover the risk premium of fraud.
Section 4.2 studies an extension in which suppressible signals may have a non-
zero suppression cost. In this case, the suppression cost is deducted from the fraud
simulation lottery. This allows the principal to recover the suppression cost that would
be otherwise wasted if the agent actually committed fraud.
The conditions under which optimal contracts deter fraud are quite general. Fraud
may only be imperfectly detectable, with the principal never having the possibility of
receiving a conclusive signal that it occurred. Fraud may be dynamic. For instance, the
agent is free to choose to conduct small amounts of fraud over a long period of time,
including that the possibility that an agent could lie low for a while after incriminating
information comes out. There may or may not be a suppression cost involved. However,
none of these issues have any bearing on whether the no-fraud policy is optimal. The
key assumption is that the support of the counterfeit signal distribution only contains
unsuppressible signals. The role of this assumption and other assumptions are discussed
in Section 4.3.
4.1 Suboptimality of Risky Fraud
The following theorem establishes that contracts can always be transformed to eliminate
fraud without reducing payoﬀs. Moreover, if fraud is risky, then the principal may
recover the risk premium of fraud.
Deﬁnition 1. A contract ({pt(·)} , e, {ft(·)}) involves risky fraud if at some history
(θt−1, θˆt),
1. the agent conducts fraud, i.e. ft(θ
t−1, θˆt) = 1, and
2. two possible counterfeit signals θt and θ
′
t in the support of φ(·) lead to diﬀering
payments at some subsequent time τ ≥ t, i.e. pτ (θt−1, θt, ·) 6= pτ (θt−1, θ′t, ·).
Theorem 1. Suppose {pt(·)} implements eﬀort e and fraud policy {ft(·)} in Problem 1.
Then there exists a payment policy {pˆt(·)} that implements eﬀort e and the no-fraud
policy {f∗t (·)} such that the implementation cost is
1. lower if the original contract involves risky fraud, and
2. the same otherwise.
The proof involves the following sequence of transformations. In Lemma 1, a new
contract is constructed in which fraud conducted by the agent is delegated to the
principal. The principal simulates counterfeit signals with public lotteries drawn every
period. The transformation from the original contract to the new contract is reminiscent
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of the revelation principle in that the principal simulates the agent's strategy to arrive
at a simpler contract.
Lemma 2 shows that the public nature of the lottery draws in the new contract is
irrelevant to the agent's incentives. This is because the agent has a weakly dominant
strategy, namely no fraud, that is independent of any information he receives throughout
the contract. This allows a simpler contract in which the lotteries and payments are
hidden from the agent.
In Lemma 3, the principal increases her payoﬀ by replacing the lotteries with their
certainty equivalents. This transformation allows the principal to extract the risk pre-
mia of fraud. The transformation is possible if fraud is costless; as in the Holmstrom
(1979) suﬃcient statistic theorem, the agent's incentives are preserved throughout this
transformation. Therefore, even if fraud is costless to conduct, it is still suboptimal
when it imposes gratuitous risk on the agent.
When the agent delegates fraud to the principal in Lemma 1, the principal pays
the agent a lottery. As Problem 1 does not include the possibility of paying lotteries,
I generalize the notation here. Henceforth, tildes above letters will indicate that a
variable is related to a lottery. The principal pays the agent p˜t(θ
t, εt) that depends on
the public random draws εt. Each εt is drawn from a distribution ψt(·|θt; εt−1) at the
end of period t. The agent's fraud policy {ft(·; ·)} in this setting is a function of both
the signals (θt−1, θˆt) and the lottery draws εt−1. The Bellman equations (1) and (2) for
the agent generalize to the lottery setting in a natural way:
Wt(e; θ
t−1, εt−1) =
∑
θˆ
pi(θˆ|e)Vt(e; θt−1, θˆ; εt−1) (3)
Vt(e; θ
t−1, θˆ; εt−1) (4)
= max
Eεt
(
u(p˜t(θ
t−1, θˆ; εt)) + βWt+1(e; θt−1, θˆ; εt)
)
,
Eεt
(∑
θ φ(θ)
[
u(p˜t(θ
t−1, θ; εt)− c(θˆ)) + βWt+1(e; θt−1, θ; εt)
])
.
Fraud involves replacing a signal with a counterfeit drawn from the distribution
φ(·). The principal may simulate fraud by ignoring an observed signal, and paying the
agent as if she observed an independent draw from the counterfeit signal distribution.
The principal may simulate fraud policy {ft(·)} by
1. drawing εt from φ(·) at histories where the agent would have committed fraud,
and
2. setting εt = θt at histories where the agent would not have committed fraud.
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This idea leads to the following deﬁnition of the fraud simulation lottery.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a contract ({pt(·)} , e, {ft(·)}) the corresponding fraud simulation
lottery is
s˜t(θ
t; εt) = pt(ε
t),
where εt is drawn from the distribution
ψt(εt|θt, εt−1) =
I(εt = θt) if ft(εt−1, θt) = 0,φ(εt) if ft(εt−1, θt) = 1,
and I() is the indicator function that is 1 if the proposition  is true, and 0 otherwise.
In the fraud simulation lottery, εt plays the role of the (simulated) public history,
and θt plays the role of the private history. Even though the principal observes both
the simulated public and private histories, she commits to ignoring the private history
in order to deter fraud.
Lemma 1. Suppose the payment policy {pt(·)} implements eﬀort e with fraud policy
{ft(·)}. Then the fraud simulation lottery {s˜t(·; ·)} implements e with the non-fraud
policy {f∗t (·; ·)}. The implementation cost is the same under both contracts.
Proof. By construction, the signals in the old contract, θt, and the new contract, εt,
are identically distributed, provided the agent does not deviate from the prescribed
no-fraud policy. Hence, the payments are identically distributed in the two contracts.
It remains to show that the new contract respects the fraud incentive constraint
(IC-f). Recall that the support of the counterfeit signal distribution only includes
unsuppressible signals. This means that regardless of the agent's choices, the fraud
simulation lottery ensures that a real or simulated (but not both) counterfeit signal is
drawn at every history in which fraud is committed under the original contract, i.e. at
every history in which ft(ε
t−1, θˆt) = 1. The only question is whether the agent might
proﬁtably deviate by committing fraud at some additional history. But this would
contradict the original fraud policy {ft(·)} being optimal under the original payment
rule. Hence the no-fraud policy {f∗t (·; ·)} is optimal under the new contract.
Lemma 1 showed that fraud may be replaced with lotteries without disrupting the
agent's incentives. The rest of the proof of Theorem 1 involves showing that if these
lotteries are replaced with their certainty equivalents, the principal may recover the
risk premia of fraud without disrupting incentives. However, the notion of certainty
equivalent is subtle in this dynamic setting. The payment in time period t depends
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on the entire history of lottery draws εt, so that uncertainty about εt creates risk for
the agent in future periods. Therefore, the right notion of certainty equivalent must be
applied to capture the dynamic risk of the dynamic lotteries and to ensure the dynamic
no-fraud incentive constraints are respected.
The following lemma addresses relationship between the lottery draws εt and the
dynamic incentives. Lemma 2 establishes that the lottery draws and the resulting
payments may be hidden from the agent, since the no-fraud action is a weakly dominant
at every history for him. This hidden lottery setting is purely of technical interest, as
the agent does not observe his own utility. In this setting, the lottery draws are no
longer a state variable, and the agent's Bellman equation (4) becomes
Vt(e; θ
t−1, θˆ) (5)
= max
Eεt
(
u(p˜t(θ
t−1, θˆ; εt))
)
+ βWt+1(e; θ
t−1, θˆ),∑
θ φ(θ)
[
Eεt
(
u(p˜t(θ
t−1, θ; εt)− c(θˆ))
)
+ βWt+1(e; θ
t−1, θ)
]
.
Lemma 2. If a lottery payment policy {p˜t(·, ·)} implements e with the no-fraud policy
in Problem 1, then it implements e with the no-fraud policy in the hidden lottery setting
of (5).
Proof. Since {p˜t(·, ·)} implements the no-fraud policy, the agent has a weakly dominant
strategy. This means the realizations of εt are irrelevant to the agent's decisions.
Finally, Lemma 3 shows that the lotteries used to simulate counterfeit signals can
be replaced by their certainty equivalents. This does not aﬀect the agent's payoﬀs, but
the principal's payoﬀ is increased by the risk premium of the lottery. Therefore, the
principal is better oﬀ deterring fraud whenever it is risky for the agent.
Lemma 3. Suppose p˜t(·; ·) is a lottery payment policy that implements eﬀort e and the
no-fraud policy {f∗t (·)}) in the hidden lotteries setting. Then the certainty equivalent
payment policy deﬁned by
u(pˆt(θ
t)) = Eεt [u(p˜t(θ
t, εt))|θt] (6)
also implements (e, {f∗t (·)}). It is less costly for the principal whenever any of the
payments p˜t(θ
t; ·) are non-degenerate lotteries.
Proof. Since c(θˆ) ∈ {0,∞} for all θˆ ∈ Θ, it follows that fraud deviation payoﬀs are
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preserved by the new payment policy, i.e.
u(pˆt(θ
t)− c(θˆ)) = Eεt [u(p˜t(θt, εt)− c(θˆ))|θt]. (7)
Substituting (6) and (7) into the agent's Bellman equation (2) in the non-lottery setting
gives the Bellman equation:
Vt(e; θ
t−1, θˆ) (8)
= max
Eεt
[
Eεt [u(p˜t(θ
t, εt))|θt]]+ βWt+1(e; θt−1, θˆ),∑
θt
φ(θt)
(
Eεt
[
Eεt [u(p˜t(θ
t, εt)− c(θˆ))|θt]
]
+ βWt+1(e; θ
t)
)
.
After removing the redundant expectations (by the law of iterated expectations), this
becomes the value function (5) under the lottery payment policy {p˜t(·; ·)}. Since the
value functions are equivalent under the two payment policies, by the Principle of
Optimality, they implement the same actions.
If any of the lotteries p˜t(θ
t; ·) are non-degenerate, then the new payment policy
is less costly to the principal. The principal's expected payment is lowered by the
risk premium of this lottery, which is greater than zero. This follows from a standard
argument by Holmstrom (1979). By Jensen's inequality, the concavity of u implies
u(pt(θ
t)) = Eεt [u(p˜t(θ
t; εt))|θt] < u (Eεt [p˜t(θt; εt)|θt]) . (9)
Since u is increasing it follows that
pt(θ
t) < Eεt [p˜t(θ
t; εt)|θt].
This completes the proof of Theorem 1, that optimal contracts deter risky fraud.
In fact, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 also establish that lotteries are suboptimal:
Corollary 1. If the no-fraud contract ({p˜t(·; ·)} , e, {f∗t (·, ·)}) is a solution to the lottery
extension of Problem 1 of implementing eﬀort e, then {p˜t(·; ·)} is a degenerate lottery.
4.2 Extension: Suboptimality of Costly Fraud
The analysis above established that optimal contracts deter risky fraud, because the
principal may simulate fraud more eﬃciently than the agent may commit it. Another
reason that fraud may be ineﬃcient is that the agent may have to pay a suppression
cost c(θˆ) ∈ (0,∞) to suppress the signal θˆ. This section shows optimal contracts deter
costly fraud, because the principal may recover the suppression cost with an appropriate
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fraud simulation payment policy. The fraud simulation lottery may be generalized to
this setting in a straightforward way: the principal deducts the suppression cost of
fraud from payments at the histories where it simulates fraud for the agent.
In the costly fraud setting, the suppression cost is any function c : Θ→ [0,∞]. An
important diﬀerence in this setting is that Lemma 3 no longer holds, so that lottery
payment policies may be a feature of optimal contracts, and the principal may not
be able to recover the risk premium of risky fraud. To see this, suppose the agent
has decreasing absolute risk aversion. Then if the agent pays a suppression cost, his
risk aversion would increase, so lotteries may be used by the principal to increase the
eﬀective cost of fraud to the agent. Consequently, this section expands the set of
possible payment policies the principal may choose to include lotteries, as deﬁned in
(4). On the other hand, if the agent has constant absolute risk aversion, then Lemma 3
holds in the costly fraud setting.
The fraud simulation lottery in Deﬁnition 2 generalizes to the costly fraud setting as
follows. Given a contract ({p˜t(·; ·)} , e, {ft(·; ·)}) with lottery draws εt ∼ ψt(·|θt, εt−1),
the corresponding fraud simulation lottery is
s˜t(θ
t; εt, δt) = p˜t(δ
t; εt)− ft(δt−1, θt; εt−1)c(θt),
where (εt, δt) is drawn from
ρt(εt, δt|θt; εt−1, δt−1) = ψt(εt|θt; εt−1)
I(δt = θt) if ft(δt−1, θt; εt−1) = 0,φ(δt) if ft(δt−1, θt; εt−1) = 1.
Deﬁnition 3. The contract ({p˜t(·; ·)} , e, {ft(·; ·)}) involves costly fraud if at some his-
tory (θt−1, θˆt; εt−1),
1. the agent conducts fraud, i.e. ft(θ
t−1, θˆt; εt−1) = 1, and
2. the signal θˆt has a strictly positive suppression cost, i.e. c(θˆt) > 0.
Proposition 1. If the lottery {p˜t(·, ·)} implements eﬀort e and fraud policy {ft(·, ·)},
then the fraud simulation lottery {s˜t(·, ·)} implements eﬀort e and the no-fraud policy
f∗t (·, ·). The implementation cost under the fraud simulation lottery is
1. lower if the original contract involves costly fraud, and
2. the same otherwise.
Proof. The proof is analogous to Lemma 1.
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4.3 Robustness of Optimal Fraud Policy
The results above establish general conditions under which optimal contracts deter
fraud. This section explores the assumptions that lead to this result, and how they
may break down.
Counterfeit signals are unsuppressible
One key assumption is that all signals in the support of the counterfeit distribution are
unsuppressible. This assumption implies that the agent may only commit fraud once
each time period. I illustrate with an example that if the assumption is dropped, but
the restriction of one fraud attempt per period is retained, then the no-fraud results of
Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 do not hold. This is because the fraud simulation lottery
eﬀectively allows the agent to circumvent the limit of fraud attempts. However, if both
the assumption and the one-attempt restriction are dropped, then these no-fraud results
hold.
Suppose T = 1 and that there are there possible private signals, θˆ ∈ {A,B,C}.
After eﬀort e = 0, the signal is drawn uniformly from {A,B}, and after eﬀort e = 1,
the signal θˆ is uniformly distributed over all possible signals. The fraud technology
allows A to be suppressed and replaced with a uniform draw from {A,B}. Unlike
Problem 1, the counterfeit signal distribution includes a suppressible signal A in its
support.
Suppose that the agent may not attempt to suppress A more than once. The fraud
simulation lottery in this setting is s˜(θ, ε) = p(ε), where ε is drawn uniformly from
{A,B} if θ = A, and ε = θ if θ 6= A. Lemma 1 fails in this example: the fraud
simulation lottery does not deter fraud. If the agent commits fraud under this payment
policy, then the probability of either the agent or the principal replacing A with B is 34 ;
the agent is eﬀectively given two chances to suppress the bad news A. This means that
when the agent is limited to one suppression attempt, the fraud simulation eﬀectively
expands the set of possible fraud strategies available to him. This problem is avoided
when the assumption that all signals in the support of the counterfeit distribution
are unsuppressible is made: the fraud simulation lottery does not introduce any new
possibilities for the agent in this case.
Another way to avoid this problem is to allow the agent to repeatedly suppress
signals until it draws an unsuppressible signal (B). In this case, the fraud simulation
lottery does not allow the agent to conduct any more fraud than he could under the
original contract. Thus, the main assumption needed for Lemma 1 to hold is that the
fraud simulation policy does not expand the feasible set of fraud policies that the agent
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may choose from. If this assumption is met, then the fraud simulation lottery deters
fraud, since the principal simulates an optimal fraud policy for the agent.
There are other ways an asymmetry may arise when the principal pays the agent
a fraud simulation lottery. If the agent may repeatedly suppress signals, but with in-
creasing marginal suppression cost each time, then the fraud simulation lottery does
not deter fraud. The fraud simulation lottery eﬀectively lowers the agent's marginal
suppression cost, which gives the agent an incentive to commit more fraud. This ex-
plains why fraud is optimal in the model of Lacker and Weinberg (1989), which has an
increasing marginal cost of falsiﬁcation.
Multiple Fraud Technologies
In Problem 1, the agent only has access to a single fraud technology. However, this
is not important for the results. Suppose that the agent had access to a set of fraud
technologies Y , where each technology y ∈ Y consists of a suppression cost function cy(·)
and a counterfeit signal distribution φy(·). Theorem 1 generalizes to this setting. In
particular, the principal may simulate fraud by drawing from the appropriate counterfeit
signal distribution at each history (and subtracting the appropriate suppression cost,
as in the extension in Section 4.2).
Unknown Fraud Technology
If the principal is not fully informed about the fraud technology, then all optimal
contracts may involve fraud. The fraud simulation lottery idea does not apply directly,
as the principal does not know ex ante which counterfeit signal distribution(s) are
available to the agent, and at what cost(s). It may be feasible for the principal to induce
the agent to reveal its private information about the fraud technology to the principal.
However, this is not optimal in general. For example, if the agent has a suﬃciently
low probability of having access to a fraud technology, the cost from distorting the
payment policy to screen the agent types would outweigh the beneﬁt of recovering the
risk premia and/or suppression costs of fraud.
5 Optimal Payment Policy
The previous section showed that under general conditions, optimal contracts deter
risky and costly fraud, and can be adapted to deter all fraud. However, the question
remains: what are the optimal incentives to deter fraud, and how do they interact with
incentives for productive eﬀort? Signals vary in the extent to which they are good
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news about the agent's eﬀort, whether or not they are suppressible, and if they are
suppressible, how suspicious they are. Thus, there are three aspects of signals that are
potentially relevant for payments. This section establishes that the principal separately
evaluates the good news and suspicious news aspects. Better news is paid more, and
suspicious news is paid less. However, this is not the end of the story. The principal is
lenient on suppressible bad news, which reduces the incentives for the agent to commit
fraud. Equally bad news that is unsuppressible is not forgiven in this way, because
harsh punishments after unsuppressible signals do not invite fraud (as it is infeasible
for the agent). Thus, all three dimensions of the signals are relevant for payments:
better news is rewarded more, suspicious news is rewarded less, and suppressible bad
news is treated leniently compared to equally bad unsuppressible news.
This section begins by reformulating the principal's problem in a manner suitable for
taking ﬁrst-order conditions. This involves writing the constraints in a sequence form
(rather than a dynamic programming form), and applying the ﬁrst-order approach
to simplify the agent's eﬀort constraint. Then the section proceeds to use ﬁrst-order
conditions to characterize the payment policy.
5.1 Problem Reformulation
The goal of this section is to transform Problem 1 into a form in which ﬁrst-order
conditions may be applied to characterize the optimal payment policy. There are two
approaches in dynamic contract theory: Rogerson (1985b) applies a variational ap-
proach based on the sequence problem, and Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Thomas
and Worrall (1990) simplify the problem by applying a dynamic programming approach
with promised utility as the state variable.
While dynamic programming was helpful in studying the agent's problem, its ap-
plication to the principal's problem is problematic. Firstly, the model has persistence,
in the sense that the eﬀort choice e aﬀects information and behavior in every subse-
quent period. This means that an additional state variable (promised marginal beneﬁt
of eﬀort) would be required, and the agent's incentive constraints would need to be
reformulated in terms of both state variables.6 Secondly, diﬀerent fraud incentive con-
straints bind at diﬀerent histories, and at states where the binding constraint changes,
the principal's value function would be non-diﬀerentiable.
In contrast to the diﬃculties of the dynamic programming approach, the varia-
tional approach of Rogerson (1985b) is relatively simple. In the repeated moral hazard
6 This is similar to the analysis of Williams (2011), in which the promised marginal utility of the private
state is an additional state variable in the principal's dynamic programming problem.
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problem of Rogerson (1985b), optimal contracts may involve the agent playing a non-
stationary strategy. However, in view of Theorem 1, optimal contracts in the counter-
feit signals model involve an eﬀort choice followed by the stationary no-fraud strategy.
To summarize, the single persistent eﬀort choice, followed by a sequence of identical
non-fraud choices adds minimal complexity to the principal's implementation problem.
Therefore, this section reformulates the principal's problem using a variational approach
rather than a dynamic programming approach.
The rest of the paper focuses on Problem 2, which involves implementing the no-
fraud policy. Theorem 1 established that the implementation cost is the same as in
Problem 1, even though the principal is more constrained.
Problem 2. The principal's no-fraud implementation problem is to minimize the ex-
pected cost of implementing eﬀort e,
C(e) = min
{pt(·)}
E
[
T∑
t=1
βtpt(θ
t)
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
s.t. (VP) βW1(e)− e ≥ u0
(IC-e) e ∈ argmax
eˆ∈[0,1]
βW1(eˆ)− eˆ
(IC-f∗) f∗t (·) solves the dynamic programming problem in (1) and (2),
where θt ∼ pi(·|e).
The rest of the section reformulates the (VP), (IC-e) and (IC-f) constraints into a
form suitable for taking ﬁrst-order conditions. Since the agent ﬁnds the no-fraud policy
is optimal at eﬀort e, the (VP) constraint may be rewritten non-recursively as
(VP′) E
[
T∑
t=1
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
− e ≥ u0.
The no-fraud constraint, (IC-f∗) may also be rewritten non-recursively. By the one-
shot deviation principle, the constraint may be formulated as a set of constraints, one
for each history θˆt, that requires the agent to prefer the no-fraud continuation policy
over suppressing θˆt only. Adopting the convention that all expectations are with respect
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to the real signal distribution pi(·|e), the constraint may be rewritten as
(IC-f∗) for all θˆτ , E
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ = θˆτ
]
≥ E
[
φ(θτ )
pi(θτ |e)
(
βτu(pτ (θ
τ )− c(θˆτ )) +
T∑
t=τ+1
βtu(pt(θ
t))
)∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = θˆτ−1
]
.
Note that the expectation for counterfeiting includes the likelihood ratio, φ(θτ )pi(θτ |e) in order
to replace the (implicitly included) real signal distribution with the counterfeit signal
distribution.
Finally, the (IC-e) constraint is complicated because it involves a continuum of
inequalities (one for each e), each of which is complex because the agent may deviate
to a diﬀerent fraud policy for diﬀerent eﬀort levels eˆ 6= e. A common simpliﬁcation is
to replace (IC-e) with its ﬁrst-order condition,
W ′1(e) = 1.
This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, ﬁrst-order conditions are merely nec-
essary (not suﬃcient) for the agent to ﬁnd e an optimal eﬀort choice. Thus, this new
constraint involves a relaxation of the principal's problem. Appendix B establishes that
the relaxed and original problems share the same solution when there is one time period
(T = 1), under some mild conditions on the signal distribution pi. It is an open question
whether the ﬁrst-order approach is valid when there are more time periods.
Secondly, the ﬁrst-order condition is not well-deﬁned, as the value function W1 is
not diﬀerentiable at all eﬀort levels. The agent's value function is the upper envelope
of a set of diﬀerentiable functions, one for each fraud policy. The upper envelope
need not be diﬀerentiable at eﬀort choices where the agent is indiﬀerent between two
fraud policies. However, the constraint only requires W1 to be diﬀerentiable at the
implemented eﬀort e. Theorem 1 of Clausen and Strub (2011) shows that the value
function is diﬀerentiable at e, since e is an optimal choice for the agent. Moreover, the
same theorem establishes that W ′1(e) may be evaluated at the agent's optimal fraud
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policy (i.e. no-fraud). Hence,
W ′1(e) =
[
d
deˆ
E
[
T∑
t=1
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣eˆ
]] ∣∣∣∣∣
eˆ=e
(10)
= E
[
T∑
t=1
pie(θ
t|e)
pi(θt|e) β
tu(pt(θ
t)
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
(11)
= E
[
T∑
t=1
t∑
τ=1
pie(θτ |e)
pi(θτ |e) β
tu(pt(θ
t)
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
. (12)
This establishes that
(IC-e′) E
[
T∑
t=1
t∑
τ=1
pie(θτ |e)
pi(θτ |e) β
tu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
= 1.
is a relaxation of (IC-e).
After replacing the (VP), (IC-e) and (IC-f∗) constraints with the constraints above,
the reformulated problem is suitable for taking ﬁrst-order conditions:
Problem 3. The principal's reformulated implementation problem is
C(e) = min
pt(·)
E
[
T∑
t=1
βtpt(θ
t)
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
s.t. (VP′) E
[
T∑
t=1
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
− e ≥ u0
(IC-e′) E
[
T∑
t=1
t∑
τ=1
pie(θτ |e)
pi(θτ |e) β
tu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
= 1.
(IC-f∗) for all θˆτ , E
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ = θˆτ
]
≥ E
[
φ(θτ )
pi(θτ |e)
(
βτu(pτ (θ
τ )− c(θˆτ )) +
T∑
t=τ+1
βtu(pt(θ
t))
)
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = θˆτ−1
]
,
where all expectations are taken with respect to θt ∼ pi(·|e).
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5.2 Characterization
Let (λ, µ,
{
νt(θ
t)
}
) be the Lagrange multipliers on the voluntary participation con-
straint, eﬀort incentive constraint, and no-fraud incentive constraint at history θt. The
following theorem characterizes the optimal payment policy in the two cases, that the
fraud constraint is slack (i.e. (IC-f∗) holds with strict inequality) or binds (i.e. (IC-f∗)
holds with equality).
Theorem 2. If {p∗t (·)} is an optimal solution to Problem 3 with Lagrange multipliers
(λ∗, µ∗, {ν∗t (·)}), then:
1. If the no-fraud incentive constraint (IC-f∗) is slack at history θt, then
1
u′(p∗t (θt))
=
1
u′(p∗t−1(θt−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
yesterday
+µ∗
pie(θt|e)
pi(θt|e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
good news
measure
−ν¯∗t (θt−1)
φ(θt)
pi(θt|e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
suspicious news
measure
, (13)
where the ﬁrst term on the right is replaced by λ∗ for t = 1, and
ν¯∗t (θ
t−1) =
∑
θˆt
ν∗t (θ
t−1, θˆt). (14)
2. If the no-fraud incentive constraint (IC-f∗) binds at histories (θt−1, θt) and (θt−1, θ′t),
then p∗τ (θt−1, θt, ·) = p∗τ (θt−1, θ′t, ·) for all τ ≥ t.
The ﬁrst part identiﬁes three components of payments when the no-fraud constraint
does not bind, i.e. at histories where the agent strictly prefers not to destroy the
signal and replace it with a counterfeit. The terms in the ﬁrst-order condition may be
interpreted as follows. In a pure insurance problem (absent any moral hazard or fraud
concerns), the principal's ﬁrst-order condition would be
1
u′(p∗t (θt))
=
1
u′(p∗t−1(θt−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
yesterday
,
which means that the agent's payment is the same at every history, i.e. complete
insurance and consumption smoothing. Adding in moral hazard incentive concerns
(but leaving aside fraud concerns), the principal's ﬁrst-order condition would be
1
u′(p∗t (θt))
=
1
u′(p∗t−1(θt−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
yesterday
+µ∗
pie(θt|e)
pi(θt|e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
good news
measure
,
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which means that the agent is rewarded more after better news about its eﬀort e. The
marginal likelihood ratio in the last term is a standard measure of good news in moral
hazard problems, and is discussed by Milgrom (1981). Brieﬂy, higher values represent
better news about the agent's eﬀort, positive and negative values are possible, and its
expected value is zero. Finally, in the moral hazard with counterfeit signals model, the
ﬁrst-order condition is
1
u′(p∗t (θt))
=
1
u′(p∗t−1(θt−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
yesterday
+µ∗
pie(θt|e)
pi(θt|e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
good news
measure
−ν¯∗t (θt−1)
φ(θt)
pi(θt|e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
suspicious news
measure
,
which means the agent is rewarded less after more suspicious news. In the last term,
the measure of suspiciousness is the likelihood ratio that the signal was drawn from
the counterfeit distribution versus the real distribution (for the contracted eﬀort level
e). Higher likelihood ratios indicate more suspicious signals. The likelihood ratio is
multiplied by ν¯∗t (θt−1), which is the sum of the Lagrange multipliers at that history.
The νt(θ
t−1, θˆt) multiplier is non-zero only if the no-fraud incentive constraint binds
for θˆt. These multipliers are summed because deterring fraud aﬀects payments in the
same way, regardless of the signal being suppressed: signals that appear suspicious are
punished.
The ﬁrst-order condition (13) only applies if the no-fraud constraint is slack at θt.
If it binds, then the ﬁrst-order condition would pay the agent too little, which would
give the agent an incentive to suppress the signal. In other words, if the signal is
unsuppressible, the principal is at liberty to punish the agent according to the ﬁrst-
order condition. If the signal is suppressible, then the principal must be lenient after
suﬃciently bad news. When the principal is lenient in this way, the agent is paid enough
to be indiﬀerent between committing fraud or not. If the no-fraud constraint binds for
two histories (θt−1, θt) and (θt−1, θ′t), then the agent's expected discounted utility is
the same, since the payoﬀ from fraud is the same in both cases. The second part of
the theorem establishes that these histories are treated identically at all subsequent
time periods. This means that if θt is worse news than θ
′
t, then θt is forgiven more.
The principal ﬁnds it optimal to discard suﬃciently bad news from consideration 
but only if the news is suppressible. This result is similar to a ﬁnding of Allen and
Gale (1992). In their setting, fraud gives rise to incomplete contracts that disregard
informative signals.
The proof of the ﬁrst part involves elementary manipulation of the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions of Problem 3, so it is in the appendix. The proof of the second part appears below.
The proof strategy is to suppose (for the sake of contradiction) that the payments do
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diﬀer across the two signals θt and θ
′
t, and construct a new payment policy that stochas-
tically swaps the two signals. The new payment policy implements the same eﬀort and
the no-fraud policy at the same implementation cost  but as in Corollary 1, the prin-
cipal could reduce its implementation cost be replacing the lottery with its certainty
equivalent. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2 part 2. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that at some his-
tories (ητ−1, ητ ) and (ητ−1, η′τ ), the no-fraud constraint binds but for some τ ′ ≥ τ ,
p∗τ ′(η
τ−1, ητ , ·) 6= p∗τ ′(ητ−1, η′τ , ·). This proof will construct a new payment policy that
implements the same eﬀort e and the no-fraud policy at lower implementation cost.
Consider the payment policy {pˆt(·)} that swaps (ητ−1, ητ ) and (ητ−1, η′τ ), i.e.
pˆt(θ
t) =

p∗t (ητ−1, η′τ , θτ+1, . . . , θt) if θτ = (ητ−1, ητ ),
p∗t (ητ−1, ητ , θτ+1, . . . , θt) if θτ = (ητ−1, η′τ ),
p∗t (θt) otherwise.
Since the no-fraud constraint binds at both histories, the agent's value is the same, i.e.
Wτ+1(e; η
τ−1, ητ ) = Wτ+1(e; ητ−1, η′τ ).
Under the new payment policy, the agent's value {Wˆ t(e; ·)} is obtained by swapping
(ητ−1, ητ ) and (ητ−1, η′τ ) in {Wt(e; ·)}. Before time τ , the value functions under both
payment policies are the same, so fraud is deterred by the principal of optimality.
After time τ , the value functions are swapped between the two histories, but fraud is
deterred by both continuation payment policies, so fraud is deterred under the new
payment policy {pˆt(·)}.
However, the new payment policy has a diﬀerent probability distribution of pay-
ments (at eﬀort e). This change may be undone by randomizing between the two
payment policies based on a random draw ετ ∈ {ητ , η′t} at the histories (ηt−1, ηt) and
(ηt−1, η′t). (The random draws at all other histories are degenerate.) For example, one
such lottery payment policy is
p˜t(θ
t; εt) =

p∗t (θt) if θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ ∈ {ητ , η′τ}, and ετ = θτ ,
pˆt(θ
t) if θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ ∈ {ητ , η′τ}, and ετ 6= θτ ,
p∗t (θt) otherwise,
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where ετ is drawn from
ψτ (ετ |θτ , ετ−1) = pi(ετ |e, ετ ∈
{
ητ , η
′
τ
}
).
Since both the original payment policy {p∗t (·)} and the swapped payment policy {pˆt(·)}
deter fraud, the lottery payment policy {p˜t(·; ·)} that randomizes between them deters
fraud as well. Since the probability distribution of payments is the same under {p˜t(·; ·)}
and {p∗t (·)} when the agent follows the no-fraud policy, the left side of the eﬀort incentive
constraint (IC-e′) is the same in both cases. This is most simply seen by studying the
form of the eﬀort constraint based on (11):
EθT , εT
[
T∑
t=1
pie(θ
t|e)
pi(θt|e) β
tu(p˜t(θ
t; εt))
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
= EθT
[
T∑
t=1
pie(θ
t|e)
pi(θt|e) β
tu(p∗t (θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e
]
.
Thus, {p˜t(·; ·)} implements eﬀort e and the no-fraud policy in Problem 3 at the same
implementation cost as {p∗t (·)}. However, lottery payment policies are suboptimal, as
Corollary 1 generalizes to the setting of Problem 3. Thus, {p∗t (·)} is a suboptimal
payment policy  a contradiction.
To summarize, optimal payment policies in the moral hazard with counterfeit signals
model are closely related to those in standard moral hazard settings. As in standard
settings, the payment policies feature insurance and consumption smoothing as well as
higher payments after better news about the agent's eﬀort. However, to deter fraud,
optimal payments reward suspicious signals less, and are lenient on suppressible bad
news.
6 Counterfeit Good News
In the click fraud and fake job interview examples, the agent is able to replace no news
with counterfeit good news. While all good news signals are equally indicative of high
eﬀort, some good news signals appear more suspicious than others. For example, a click
originating from an IP address within the organized computer crime group, the Russian
Business Network (discussed below), is suspicious good news. Similarly, an unemployed
worker's claim to have attended a job interview with a close relative is suspicious good
news. The principal's problem is to reward good news without creating perverse incen-
tives for creating fake good news. This section the studies counterfeit good news case,
and ﬁnds that the implementation cost increases as the real and counterfeit good news
signals become more alike. This is followed by an argument that the model matches
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Google's controversial history with click fraud.
6.1 Model
In the counterfeit good news case of Problem 3, the agent's eﬀort increases the arrival
probability a(e) of good news, which is an unsuppressible signal θˆt drawn from some
distribution piG(·). Otherwise no news arrives, which is represented by the null signal
θˆt = 0. Thus, the private signals are drawn from
pi(θˆ|e) =
1− a(e) if θˆ = 0,a(e)piG(θˆ) if θˆ 6= 0.
The agent may suppress the null signal at no cost, in which case a counterfeit signal is
drawn from φ(·). In the counterfeit good news setting, Supp(φ) ⊆ Supp(piG) = Θ\ {0},
so it is possible to study what happens as these distributions become more alike.
6.2 Analysis
The ﬁrst-order condition (13) from Theorem 2 implies that after good news θt 6= 0, the
agent is paid
1
u′(p∗t (θt))
=
1
u′(p∗t−1(θt−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
yesterday
+µ∗
a′(e)
a(e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
good news
measure
−ν¯t(θt−1) φ(θt)
pi(θt|e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
suspicious news
measure
. (15)
As usual, more suspicious news is rewarded less. In general, it is not possible to rank
unsuspicious bad news versus suspicious good news. But in this case, it is clear that
to deter fraud, at least one signal has to be paid less than the null signal  otherwise
fraud would be a dominant strategy. Therefore, suﬃciently suspicious news is paid less
than no news.
Proposition 2. If {pt(·)} is a solution to the counterfeit good news case of Problem 3,
then some (suspicious) good news signal is rewarded less than no news. That is, at
every history θt−1, there is some signal θ 6= 0 such that
u(pt(θ
t−1, θ)) + βWt+1(e; θt−1, θ) ≤ u(pt(θt−1, 0)) + βWt+1(e; θt−1, 0). (16)
Proof. If (16) were violated for every θ 6= 0, then multiplying both sides by φ(θ) and
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summing up would gives∑
θ 6=0
φ(θ)
[
u(pt(θ
t−1, θ)) + βWt+1(e; θt−1, θ)
]
> u(pt(θ
t−1, 0)) + βWt+1(e; θt−1, 0).
This means the agent would strictly prefer to commit fraud  a contradiction.
The following proposition shows that the principal's implementation problem be-
comes weakly more diﬃcult as the real and counterfeit signal distributions, piG(·) and
φ(·) become more alike. Let C(e;α) be the implementation cost of eﬀort e when the
counterfeit signals are distributed according to φ′ = αφ + (1− α)piG, where α ∈ [0, 1].
As α decreases, φ′ and piG become more alike.
Proposition 3. In the counterfeit good news setting, C(e; ·) is weakly decreasing and
C(e; 0) =∞.
The proof strategy is as follows: if a payment policy implements (e, {f∗t (·)}) under
the counterfeit signal distribution φ′, then it also implements (e, {f∗t (·)}) under the
counterfeit signal distribution φ(·). The key step to establishing this is to imagine
allowing the agent to make draws of counterfeit signals from the real distribution rather
than the counterfeit distribution, keeping the payment policy ﬁxed. The agent would
always prefer draws from the real distribution. If this were not the case, then the
(absurd) payment policy that throws out all good news signals, and replaces them with
a good news signal drawn from the real distribution, would also deter fraud.
Lemma 4. If {pt(·)} is a solution to the counterfeit good news case of Problem 3, then
the agent would prefer a (hypothetical) counterfeit signal draw from piG(·) rather than
φ(·) at every history ητ−1, i.e.
E
[
φ(θτ )
piG(θτ )
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
(17)
≤ E
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (17) is violated at some history ητ−1:
The rest of the proof constructs a new lottery-based payment policy that implements e
at the same implementation cost, in violation of Corollary 1. Consider the new lottery
payment policy
p˜t(θ
t; εt) = p(εt)
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deﬁned in terms of the following distribution. Let εt be the random variable that equals
θt, except at a history (η
τ−1, ητ ) in which ητ 6= 0 is good news, in which case it is a
random draw from piG(·),
ψt(εt|θt; εt−1) =
I(ε = θt) if εt−1 6= ητ−1 or θt = 0,piG(εt) if εt−1 = ητ−1 and θt 6= 0. (18)
Under the no-fraud policy, {p˜t(·; ·)} has the same probability distribution of payments
as {pt(·)} and implements e. Moreover, since the agent strictly prefers draws from φ(·)
rather than piG(·), the agent prefers not to conduct fraud at history (ητ−1, 0):
Eεt,θt
[
φ(θτ )
piG(θτ )
T∑
t=τ
βtu(p˜t(θ
t; εt))
∣∣∣∣∣e, ετ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
= Eθt
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
(by construction)
< Eθt
[
φ(θτ )
piG(θτ )
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
(by (17))
≤ Eθt
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ = (ητ−1, 0)
]
(since {pt(·)} deters fraud)
= Eεt,θt
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(p˜t(θ
t; εt))
∣∣∣∣∣e, (ετ−1, θτ ) = (ητ−1, 0)
]
(by construction).
Therefore, the lottery payment policy {p˜t(·; ·)} implements e optimally, in contradiction
to Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Firstly, it is straightforward to verify that any eﬀort e > 0 is
unimplementable when α = 0, i.e. when counterfeit and real signals are identically
distributed.
Secondly, ﬁx some α ∈ (0, 1), and set φ′ = αφ + (1 − α)piG. Suppose {pt(·)} is an
optimal payment policy for implementing e∗ given the counterfeit signal distribution φ′
in Problem 3. Since the counterfeit signal distribution does not appear in the (VP′) and
(IC-e′) constraints, the contract ({pt(·)} , e, {f∗t (·)}) satisﬁes these constraints under φ.
By Lemma 4, the agent prefers counterfeit signal draws from piG than φ
′ at every history
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ητ−1, i.e.
E
[(
α
φ(θτ )
piG(θτ )
+ (1− α)
) T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
(19)
≤ E
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
.
This implies that the agent prefers draws from piG over φ:
E
[
φ(θτ )
piG(θτ )
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
(20)
≤ E
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
.
Since a draw from φ′ is a randomization between a draw from piG and φ, it follows that
the agent prefers draws from φ′ over φ:
E
[
φ(θτ )
piG(θτ )
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
(21)
≤ E
[
φ′(θτ )
piG(θτ )
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
.
This establishes that the contract also satisﬁes the (IC-f∗) constraint under φ at every
history (ητ−1, 0):
E
[
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ = (ητ−1, 0)
]
≥ E
[
φ′(θτ )
piG(θτ )
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
(by (IC-f∗) under φ′)
≥ E
[
φ(θτ )
piG(θτ )
T∑
t=τ
βtu(pt(θ
t))
∣∣∣∣∣e, θτ−1 = ητ−1, θτ 6= 0
]
(by (21)).
Therefore, the contract is also feasible under φ, so the implementation cost under
counterfeit distribution φ is not higher than under φ′.
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6.3 Click Fraud
In the internet advertising industry, advertisers pay website publishers to direct vis-
itors to the advertisers' pages. Advertisers prefer to place their ads on high quality
websites that attract the most visitors. However, advertisers do not observe website
quality. Rather, they only observe the clicks from each website. But this is problem-
atic: publishers may attempt to defraud advertisers with fake clicks.7 Thus, advertisers
face a problem like Problem 1: how should they pay website publishers to create good
websites and direct visitors to the ads when clicks may be fabricated?
Google is an intermediary in the internet advertising market that solves the adver-
tiser's problem on the advertiser's behalf. Google (and its competitors) collect informa-
tion about each click, and decide how much to charge advertisers and reward publishers.
When the industry was in its infancy, advertisers were concerned that they were paying
for fake clicks. In 2006, Google paid a $90M settlement in a class action lawsuit led by
Lane's Gifts that alleged that Google colluded with publishers to defraud advertisers
with click fraud. Google attempted to reassure advertisers that they had solved the
click fraud problem:
By far, most invalid clicks are caught by our automatic ﬁlters and discarded
before they reach an advertiser's bill. (3/8/2006)
Undetected click fraud constitute less than 0.02% of all clicks. (2/28/2007)
However, leading computer security pundits were convinced this problem was diﬃcult
to solve:
Google's $6 billion-a-year advertising business is at risk. Google is testing
a new advertising model to deal with click fraud: cost-per-action ads. 
Bruce Schneier (7/13/2006)
Why Google Click Fraud is NOT 0.02%  zdnet.com (3/1/2007)
On the other hand, Google's CEO (but not Google's public relations spokespersons) at
the time believed that even if click fraud were rampant, this would not be a problem:8
7 Simple attempts at click fraud, such as repeatedly clicking on ads, are easy to detect by tracking IP
(internet protocol) addresses. More sophisticated fraud based on botnets of hacked computers are more
diﬃcult to detect. Markets for these botnets are provied by organized crime networks such as the Russian
Business Network of St Petersburg (see Fatal System Error, by Joseph Menn (2010)).
8 He added that Google polices clickfraud because  we don't like it, and because it does, at least for
the short-term, creates some problems before the advertiser sees it, we go ahead and try to detect it and
eliminate it.
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Eventually, the price that the advertiser is willing to pay for the conversion
will decline, because the advertiser will realize that these are bad clicks, in
other words, the value of the ad declines, so over some amount of time, the
system is in-fact, self-correcting. In fact, there is a perfect economic solution
which is to let it happen.  Eric Schmidt (3/3/2006)
Today, Google's claim that it has click fraud under control is uncontested in the
technical press. Google still uses a pay-per-click mechanism (rather than another type
such as cost-per-action), which discards suspicious clicks and blacklists publishers with
too many suspicious clicks. Google still maintains a team of engineers to improve their
click fraud detection algorithms.
These observations are consistent with the counterfeit good news model. Theorem 1
asserts that optimal contracts deter risky fraud, which matches Google's claim of deter-
ring almost all fraud rather than Schmidt's view that a perfect economic solution. . . is
to let it happen. Theorem 2 asserts that payments are lower after more suspicious
signals, which matches Google's policy of discarding suspicious clicks. Proposition 2
asserts that a suﬃciently suspicious signal is worse than no news, which loosely matches
Google's policy of blacklisting websites with too many suspicious clicks. Even though
it is optimal to deter fraud regardless of the signal distributions, Proposition 3 shows
that there is a value to improving the fraud detection technology, which is consistent
with Google's investment in these technologies.
7 Bad News Suppression
In the security ﬁrm example, the ﬁrm might suppress intrusions as a substitute for
preventing them. A similar issue arises in safety and environmental regulation, in
which regulators aim to enforce minimum standards on industrial plants. Namely, a
plant's management may prefer to suppress incidents rather than follow regulations.9
This section studies the setting in which the agent may exert eﬀort to decrease the
probability of an incident, and may also attempt to suppress news about the incident.
Incidents are equally indicative of low eﬀort, but some incidents may appear more
suspicious than others, i.e. they may appear like failed suppression attempts. This
section shows that incidents with higher suppression costs are treated less leniently in
9 A familiar example is depicted in the ﬁlm, Erin Brockovich, which according to her is true and probably
98% accurate. (See http://www.brockovich.com/movie.html.) Paciﬁc Gas and Electric attempted to
suppress hexavalent chromium contamination in Hinkley, California by buying aﬀected houses. Brockovich
was a paralegal assisting with the real estate transactions and became suspicious when she found medical
records in the case ﬁles.
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optimal contracts. This result, as well as the main theorems are discussed in the context
of computer security intrusions.
7.1 Model
The bad news suppression model is based on the reformulated Problem 3, but with the
costly fraud extension described in Section 4.2. For simplicity, this section focuses on the
one fraud period case (i.e. T = 1). The agent's eﬀort decreases the arrival probability
a(e) of bad news, which is a signal distributed according to piB(·). Otherwise no news
arrives, which is represented by the null signal θˆ = 0. After bad news θˆ arrives, the
agent may attempt to suppress it at cost c(θˆ) ∈ [0,∞]. A new signal θ would then be
drawn from φ(·), which includes no news (θ = 0) and perhaps some unsuppressible bad
news signals in its support. As discussed in Section 4.2, lotteries may be optimal in
this setting. This leads to the following implementation problem.
Problem 4. The principal's problem in the bad news suppression case is
C(e) = min
p˜(·;·)
E [p˜(θ, ε)|e]
s.t. (VP′) E [u(p˜(θ, ε))|e]− e ≥ u0
(IC-e′) E
[
pie(θ|e)
pi(θ|e) u(p˜(θ, ε))
∣∣∣∣e] = 1.
(IC-f∗) for all θˆ ∈ Θ,
Eε
[
u(p˜(θˆ, ε))
∣∣∣θˆ] ≥ Eε,θ [ φ(θ)
pi(θ|e)u(p˜(θ, ε)− c(θˆ))
∣∣∣∣e] ,
where all expectations are taken with respect θ ∼ pi(·|e) and ε ∼ ψ(·|θ).
7.2 Analysis
The following proposition establishes that if the suppression cost of bad news θ′ is
higher than that of θ′′, then the payment for the signal θ′ is weakly lower. This result
generalizes part 2 of Theorem 2, which establishes that punishments are limited when
suppression is either costless or inﬁnitely costly. This section studies the intermediate
case, and shows that punishments are more lenient for signals with lower suppression
costs.
Proposition 4. Suppose p˜(·; ·) is an optimal lottery payment policy in Problem 4.
1. If θ is a suppressible signal, then it is awarded a degenerate lottery. That is, there
exists p(θ) such that p(θ) = p˜(θ; ε) for all ε.
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2. If θ′ and θ′′ are suppressible signals with c(θ′) < c(θ′′), then p(θ′) ≥ p(θ′′).
The proof is in the appendix.
7.3 Computer Security Intrusions
On September 20, 2011, the Dutch computer security ﬁrm DigiNotar declared bankruptcy.10
It was a ﬁrm entrusted by all of the major web browsers to certify websites belonged to
who they claimed.11 DigiNotar discovered on July 19 that its servers had been hacked,
and faced an important choice: should it announce that it had been hacked and suﬀer
an immediate loss of reputation, or should it attempt to suppress the intrusion? If the
hackers only planned to exploit the intrusion for small-scale attacks such as breaking
into a small number of email accounts, then the intrusion into DigiNotar would probably
go unnoticed. If on the other hand the hackers exploited the intrusion for a widespread
attack on many targets, then the intrusion would be discovered very publicly, and a
major scandal might ensue. DigiNotar decided to suppress the intrusion, and issued
a press release the following day claiming that DigiNotar's certiﬁcates are among the
most reliable in the ﬁeld.
Unfortunately for DigiNotar, the attackers were politically motivated and wanted to
attract attention. The attackers exploited DigiNotar to issue hundreds of fake certiﬁ-
cates for websites including Google, Skype, and Iranian dissident forums. By August
28, three hundred thousand Iranian Google accounts had been hacked, and the general
public learned about the security failure. DigiNotar later admitted to covering up the
intrusion, but had already been blacklisted by the major web browsers, and bankruptcy
was inevitable.
DigiNotar's customers were not the only people aﬀected by this intrusion. Since
every major web browser trusted DigiNotar to practice careful security policies, ev-
ery internet user was potentially aﬀected by the intrusion. For example, even though
Google was not in any contractual relationship with DigiNotar, the intrusion allowed
Iranian hackers to intercept Google's communications. Therefore, we should think of
the principal in this moral hazard problem as being either the web browser develop-
ers or regulators (such as the Internet Corporation of Assigned Numbers and Names),
who might consider choosing optimal policies to implement adequate security proce-
10 These events are documented in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar, which cites a com-
prehensive list of news stories. The news report by Charles Arthur, Rogue web certiﬁcate could have
been used to attack Iran dissidents is helpful for describing the political context. It is available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/aug/30/faked-web-certificate-iran-dissidents.
11 This type of ﬁrm is called a certiﬁcate authority.
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dures for internet infrastructure. Since security ﬁrms may attempt to suppress intrusion
incidents, the principal faces an implementation problem like Problem 4.
In the DigiNotar incident, the suppression was essentially costless (DigiNotar merely
chose not to revoke the fake certiﬁcates), albeit with a risk of an enormous loss. In
this case, optimal contracts deter suppression of intrusion incidents: Theorem 1 implies
that in optimal contracts, the agent is deterred from taking on the risks associated
with fraud. This suggests that the current arrangements for internet security ﬁrms are
ineﬃcient, as DigiNotar had an incentive to take on a large risk to suppress the intrusion.
Theorem 2 suggests how web browser developers or regulators might improve welfare:
optimal contracts make punishments after intrusions occur, and suspicious intrusions
that appear like failed suppression attempts are punished more.
In other situations, suppression of bad news is costly. For example, if qui tam
whistleblower incentives were available to DigiNotar employees, then DigiNotar might
attempt to bribe its employees to keep the intrusion secret.12 In this case, Proposition 1
also implies that optimal contracts deter suppression of intrusion incidents. The general
characterization of optimal payment policies of Theorem 2 does not apply. However,
Proposition 4 does apply: intrusion incidents that are more costly to suppress are
treated less leniently. For example, if the intrusion was in a system visible to many
employees, then bribes would be more expensive, so the optimal punishment would be
relatively severe.
8 Conclusion
This paper studied a class of moral hazard problems in which, in addition to choosing
an unobservable productive eﬀort, the agent has access to a fraud technology that
allows him to suppress signals and replace them with counterfeits. This form of fraud
is ineﬃcient as it exposes the agent to gratuitous risk, involves unproductive costly
activity, and hampers incentive provision. The ﬁrst main result establishes that every
optimal contract may be transformed into another optimal contract without fraud, and
optimal contracts do not involve risky or costly fraud. The second main result shows
that the principal uses two mechanisms to deter fraud: punishing suspicious signals
and being lenient on bad signals that the agent declined the opportunity to suppress.
All suﬃciently bad suppressible news is treated identically: the optimal payment policy
ignores how bad the news is.
12 In the United States, the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.  3730 allows whistleblowers to ﬁle civil suits
against contractors that defraud the federal government and receive a qui tam portion of the damages.
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These results oﬀer an explanation of why the internet advertising market evolved
into its current form in which click fraud is deterred, suspicious clicks are discarded,
and intermediaries invest in click fraud detection technology. The results also suggest
that the large risks taken by internet security ﬁrms (speciﬁcally, certiﬁcate authorities)
in suppressing major intrusions are the result of suboptimal incentives.
While the paper focused on how the possibility of fraud aﬀects incentives, it raises
two future directions for explaining why fraud occurs. Fraud may occur if the principal
is unable to commit to being lenient on the agent, or if the principal is poorly informed
about the agent's fraud technology. More generally, this paper provides a benchmark
for understanding fraud. If fraud is rampant in some industry such as public medical
insurance, one might ask: does the principal punish suspicious news, and is she lenient
on suppressible bad news? If either answer is no, then a potential explanation for the
fraud has been identiﬁed.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2, claim 1. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to p∗t (θt) in Prob-
lem 3 is
0 =− pi(θt|e)βt + λ∗pi(θt|e)βtu′(p∗t (θt)) + µ∗pi(θt|e)
t∑
τ=1
pie(θτ |e)
pi(θτ |e) β
tu′(p∗t (θ
t))
+
t∑
τ=1
ν∗τ (θ
τ )βtu′(p∗t (θ
t))−
t∑
τ=1
∑
θˆ
ν∗τ (θ
τ−1, θˆ)pi(θt|e)φ(θt|e)
pi(θt|e)β
tu′(p∗t (θ
t))
which can be rewritten as
1 =λu′(θt, p∗t (θ
t)) + µ
t∑
τ=1
pie(θτ |e)
pi(θτ |e) u
′(p∗t (θ
t))
+
t∑
τ=1
ν∗τ (θ
τ )
u′(p∗t (θt))
pi(θt|e) −
t∑
τ=1
∑
θˆ
ν∗τ (θ
τ−1, θˆ)
φ(θt|e)
pi(θt|e)u
′(p∗t (θ
t))
and
1
u′(p∗t (θt))
= λ∗+ µ∗
t∑
τ=1
pie(θτ |e)
pi(θτ |e) +
t∑
τ=1
ντ (θ
τ )
1
pi(θτ |e) −
t∑
τ=1
∑
θˆ
ν∗τ (θ
τ−1, θˆ)
φ(θτ )
pi(θτ |e) .
This can be rewritten recursively as
1
u′(p∗t (θt))
=
1
u′(p∗t−1(θt−1))
+ µ∗
pie(θt|e)
pi(θt|e) + ν
∗
t (θ
t)
1
pi(θt|e) −
φ(θt)
pi(θt|e)
∑
θˆ
ν∗t (θ
t−1, θˆ),
(22)
If the no-fraud constraint is slack at history θt, then ν∗t (θt) = 0, which gives expression
(13).
Proof of Proposition 4. Let (λ, µ, ν(·)) be the Lagrange multipliers for the voluntary
participation, eﬀort incentive, and fraud incentive constraints. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tions with respect to p˜(θ; ε) may be written as
1
u′(p˜(θ, ε))
= λ+ µ
a′(e)
a(e)
+ ν(θ)
1
pi(θ|e) −
∑
θˆ
ν(θˆ)
u′(p˜(θ, ε)− c(θˆ))
u′(p˜(θ, ε))
φ(θ)
pi(θ|e) . (23)
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If θ is suppressible, then φ(θ) = 0, so (23) simpliﬁes to
1
u′(p˜(θ, ε))
= λ+ µ
a′(e)
a(e)
+ ν(θ)
1
pi(θ|e) , (24)
which does not depend on ε. This establishes the ﬁrst part.
If the no-fraud constraints bind at both θ′ and θ′′, then
u(p(θ′)) = Eε,θ
[
φ(θ)
pi(θ|e)u(p˜(θ, ε)− c(θ
′))
∣∣∣∣e] ,
u(p(θ′′)) = Eε,θ
[
φ(θ)
pi(θ|e)u(p˜(θ, ε)− c(θ
′′))
∣∣∣∣e] ,
which implies that u(p(θ′)) > u(p(θ′′)). On the other hand, if the no-fraud constraint
does not bind at θ′′, then ν(θ′′) = 0 so that
1
u′(p˜(θ, ε))
= λ+ µ
a′(e)
a(e)
. (25)
Since ν(θ′) ≥ 0, this establishes p(θ′) ≥ p(θ′′).
B Validity of the First-Order Approach
The analysis in Section 5 studies a ﬁrst-order approach relaxation of the principal's
problem. This section provides conditions under which the ﬁrst-order approach is valid,
i.e. the solutions to the two problems coincide. The techniques of Rogerson (1985a),
Jewitt (1988), and Conlon (2009) are inapplicable here. To see this, consider the ﬁrst-
order condition for the one-time period case of the principal's problem,
1
u′(p(θ))
= λ+ µ
pie(θ|e)
pi(θ|e) − ν
φ(θ)
pi(θ|e) .
The approach of the aforementioned papers is to show that the right side is increasing
and concave in either θ or e. Their conditions are applicable to the ﬁrst two terms, but
not the ﬁnal term. In particular, there is no reason to assume that better signals about
the agent's eﬀort are less suspicious. (On the contrary, agents prefer counterfeiting
technologies that mimic high eﬀort.)
This section establishes that the relaxed problem is equivalent to the original prob-
lem under the following conditions:
1. there is only one time period (T = 1), and
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2. the signal distribution can be decomposed into a convex combination
pi(θ|e) = a(e)piG(θ) + (1− a(e))piB(θ),
of two distributions that do not depend on e, and
3. the arrival probability a(·) in this decomposition is diﬀerentiable and concave in
eﬀort e with a′(e) > 0 for all e.
Note that the distributions in the two special cases (counterfeiting good news and
suppressing bad news) are special cases of the second condition.
The ﬁrst condition implies that if (p∗, e∗, f∗) is an optimal contract in the relaxed
problem, then the agent's value function may be written as
W (e) =
∑
θ∈Θ
pi(θ|e)u(p∗(θ)).
This is because, the agent does not ﬁnd it optimal to commit fraud even after deviating
from eﬀort e∗, as the no-fraud incentive constraint (IC-f∗) does not depend on e in the
one period case (nor in the ﬁnal period in the general case).
Under the second condition, choosing e to maximize W (e) − e is isomorphic to
choosing A = a(e) to maximize∑
θ∈Θ
[ApiG(θ) + (1−A)piB(θ)]u(p∗(θ))− a−1(A). (26)
That is, e∗ maximizes W (e)− e if and only if A∗ = a(e∗) maximizes (26).
The third condition implies that (26) is concave. This means that ﬁrst-order con-
ditions are suﬃcient for identifying maximizers of (26). By the chain rule and the
condition that a′ > 0, the set of stationary points of W (e)− e and (26) are isomorphic
(i.e. W ′(e∗) = 1 if and only if A∗ = a(e∗) is a stationary point of (26)). Therefore, if
W ′(e∗) = 1, then A∗ = a(e∗) is a stationary point of (26), and A∗ maximizes (26), so
e∗ maximizes W (e)− e.
To summarize, under the three conditions, the ﬁrst-order condition W ′(e∗) = 1 is
suﬃcient for establishing that e∗ is an optimal choice for the agent. Hence, the optimal
solution to the relaxed problem is also feasible (and hence optimal) in the original
problem.
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